04.30 – 06.30 pm

What happened previously?

Pre-noon – 04.00 pm: Where was ERDOGAN?

 

Why Fidan went to Turkish General Staff just before the coup? and Where was Erdogan, precisely? Did he go to Friday praying?

16:00

Ankara

TGS

  • Gen AKAR and Turkish Army Chief Gen Salih COLAK held a meeting on promotions and retirements in YAS meeting.

16:15

Ankara

TGS

  • Hakan FIDAN called Gen GULER and told him that an officer, ranked Major, had come and reported him some crucial issues. FIDAN also added he was sending his Deputy Sabahattin ASAL to Turkish General Staff (TGS) HQ to explain the details.
  • ASAL’s visit allegedly provoked the dissenters at the TGS HQ.

16:25

Ankara – Marmaris

  • ERDOGAN’s alleged precise location in Marmaris leaked to the newspaper Sozcu’s website by the same journalist Gokmen ULU. ULU also added the details of security measures to protect ERDOGAN to his report. The location was Serkan YAZICI’s villa next to Grand Yazici Holiday Resort [1].
  • This critical last minute leakage allegedly provoked the dissenters to locate ERDOGAN’s exact location. The timing of the leakage was interesting.

16:45

Ankara

TGS

  • Gen GULER reported the information he received from FIDAN to Gen AKAR. Having held a meeting with Gen AKAR from 16:00 on, Turkish Army Chief Gen Salih Zeki COLAK was in the room as well.
  • AKAR and GULER first communicated silently by taking notes on a paper, then left COLAK alone for a private meeting, which lasted an hour. COLAK did not understand what was going on.

17:32

Ankara

TGS

  • FIDAN’s Deputy Sabahattin ASAL came to TGS and informed GULER about the Major’s denouncement. GULER called FIDAN and invited him also to TGS HQ.

17:45

Ankara

TGS

  • AKAR and GULER, after having spent more than an hour in private, called COLAK inside and informed him about Major’s denouncement.
  • Gen AKAR tasked COLAK to immediately drive to the Army Aviation School before 19:00, with his Chief of Staff Gen UYAR, a Military Prosecutor and Commander of the Ankara Garrison to inspect if there was anything abnormal.
  • According to COLAK’s testimony, Gen AKAR informed Gen COLAK only on the suspected helicopter flight at night, not on the possibility of a coup attempt.
  • At 17:54 Sabahattin ASAL from MIT left TGS.
  • At 18:10 Hakan FIDAN arrived at TGS. FIDAN directly went to Gen AKAR’s office and joined the last five minutes of AKAR’s thirty-minute conversation with COLAK.
  • Why FIDAN bluntly risked himself and went to TGS HQ is a question mark. Since by that time, it must have been impossible to verify who was involved in the alleged coup.
  • FIDAN stayed silent until COLAK’s departure. After his departure, he explained the situation and additionally commented: “This may be part of a big event!”
  • FIDAN’s assessment of the big event was very crucial. But his failure to share it with the departing Army Chief is strange.
  • According to ERDOGAN, until the events started later that night, neither AKAR nor FIDAN called him or the Prime Minister Binali YILDIRIM and shared what was happening.
  • If FIDAN was targeted by some dissenters, naturally ERDOGAN and the Prime Minister must have also been targeted. FIDAN’s crucial assessment must have had possible implications for their safety. AKAR’ and FIDAN’s failure to inform ERDOGAN or YILDIRIM is unusual.

18:30

Ankara

TGS

  • Gen AKAR ordered the Operations Center at TGS HQ to stop and ban all military flights in Turkey.
  • According to all sides, neither AKAR nor FIDAN told ERDOGAN and YILDIRIM about the serious country-wide measures they were taking.
  • In his testimony, AKAR does not mention his long meeting with FIDAN and FIDAN’s call to ERDOGAN.
  • However, GULER and COLAK talked about FIDAN’s visit at their follow-on testimonies. According to GULER’s testimony, FIDAN made a phone call to inform ERDOGAN but only talked to the Director of President’s Guard Unit, Muhsin KOSE. The talk was very short. FIDAN asked KOSE just the question twice: “Muhsin, do you have enough men and power to confront an attack from outside?”. The reply was positive. AKAR and GULER were present in the room during the call.
  • Why did FIDAN not insist on talking to ERDOGAN? How did KOSE reply so quickly? KOSE should have asked back to FIDAN “Against what, when, whom?” and should have urged him for further details. But he did not.
  • Serkan YAZICI, the owner of the holiday resort where ERDOGAN resided, stated in a later interview published in the Government-affiliated newspaper “Milliyet” that he was with ERDOGAN’s security chief when he received the call from FIDAN around 18:00[2]. He also told that ERDOGAN’s Secretary Hasan DOGAN and his son-in-law Berat ALBAYRAK were present.
  • YAZICI stated that, after receiving the information about the alleged coup, KOSE directly entered the villa and informed ERDOGAN[3]. YAZICI’s statements are in line with GULER’s testimony.
  • On the contrary, ERDOGAN persistently claims that FIDAN did not inform him and he first heard about the alleged coup from his brother-in-law at around 21:30.
  • YAZICI later contradicted his statements about when, where and from whom KOSE received this phone call. He mentioned different locations about where KOSE was when he received the call. He once stated that they were at a café near Marmaris[4], and later changed the location to the front yard of ERDOGAN’s residence[5]. He also contradicted himself about the time of the call. He first stated the call was in the afternoon[6] and later changed it to 21:40. Later, he even claimed that the call was from a Governor and never mentioned FIDAN.
  • ERDOGAN’s deliberate denial of this call complies with the thesis that he had his own plan for 15 July 2016 and YAZICI was his collaborator.
  • If ERDOGAN accepts having the information at 18:30, then he will be seriously criticized and held responsible for not acting timely to prevent the events which caused the loss of 248 lives.
  • Despite the urgency, AKAR did not immediately call Air, Navy, and Gendarmerie Chiefs to duty. They, later on, participated in different weddings.
  • AKAR’s failure to inform his Service Chiefs is unusual. At a minimum, he would be expected to tell the Chief of the Air Force about the flight ban and even enforce the flight ban via the Chief of the Air Force, who by definition has the prime responsibility for the Turkish airspace.
  • AKAR and FIDAN did not think of banning or limiting civilian flights, although they suspected some illegal military air activity, which could endanger the civilian traffic.
  • ERDOGAN’s flight later that night from Marmaris to Istanbul was concealed among the busy civilian airline traffic around the flight path.

 

What happened next?

06.30 – 08.30 pm: Erdogan was aware of the raid?

 

[1] http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/gundem/erdogani-sozcu-buldu-1315631/
[2] http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2016/07/20/otelin-sahibi-o-geceyi-anlatti
[3] http://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/erdoganin-kaldigi-otelin-sahibi-serkan-yazici-ilk-kez-konustu
[4] http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/darbe-komisyonu-baskani-petek-o-gun-cumhurbask-40313680
[5] http://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/darbe-gecesi-marmariste-neler-yasandi-142485h.htm
[6] http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/darbe-komisyonu-baskani-petek-o-gun-cumhurbask-40313680